Justia Aerospace/Defense Opinion Summaries

Astornet alleges that it is sole exclusive licensee and owner of all rights in the 844 patent, issued in 2009 to Haddad as the inventor and entitled “Airport vehicular gate entry access system” and asserted the patent against NCR, MorphoTrust USA, and BAE Astornet alleged that the three had contracts with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to supply boarding-pass scanning systems; that TSA’s use of the equipment infringed and would infringe the patent; and that NCR and MorphoTrust were bidding for another contract to supply modified equipment whose use by TSA would also infringe. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding that Astornet’s exclusive remedy for the alleged infringement was a suit against the government in the Court of Federal Claims under 28 U.S.C. 1498. View "Astornet Techs., Inc. v. BAE Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants, naturalized U.S. citizens living in Minnesota, are from Somalia. In 2008, the FBI learned that Ali had contacted al Shabaab, a terrorist organization in Somalia. Both women were charged with conspiring to provide material support to al Shabaab, 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1); Ali with 12 counts of providing material support; and Hassan with making false statements, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2). The government informed defendants that it intended to offer evidence obtained under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. 1801. They requested disclosure and suppression of all FISA-obtained evidence. The government filed a declaration by the Attorney General that disclosure of the materials or an adversary proceeding would harm national security. After ex parte review, the court denied the defense motions. At the final status conference, Ali remained seated when court was convened. The court issued ordered all parties to stand when court was called to order. Despite counseling by “learned clerics” she continued to refuse to stand. The court cited Ali for 20 instances of contempt. After a 10-day trial the jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. For Ali, the court calculated a guidelines range of 360 months to life in prison and imposed a sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment. For Hassan, the court calculated a guidelines range of 360 to 372 months and imposed a sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Ali" on Justia Law

Dobek was an engineer in charge of providing parts for F-16 fighter planes owned by the Venezuelan Air Force. The U.S. State Department announced that munitions, including parts for military aircraft, could no longer be exported to Venezuela without an export license, and revoked existing licenses. Dobek created firms to carry on business with Venezuela. The Venezuelan Air Force told Dobek that it needed canopy seals for its F-16s. Suspecting that Dobek was selling canopy seals to Venezuela, FBI agents executed a warrant at Dobek’s home, where they found a purchase order for the seals, with no purchaser named. Dobek had certified that he understood that the “products … to be provided are controlled by the … International Traffic in Arms Regulations.” He told a friend that he was looking for a box to ship “cockpit seals.” FedEx shipping records revealed that Dobek had shipped a box, labeled as “base molding,” to Venezuela after that discussion. This pattern of purchase and shipment was repeated a year later. Dobek was convicted of exporting munitions illegally, 22 U.S.C. 2778(b)(2), and conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the admissibility of an alleged co-conspirator’s emails, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the validity of the jury instruction on willfulness, stating that evidence of willfulness was overwhelming. View "United States v. Dobek" on Justia Law

The Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee manufactures and tests components for nuclear weapons and stores highly enriched uranium, much of which is eventually “down-blended” for civilian use, at a Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF). It is not used to store or otherwise manufacture nuclear weapons or for military operations. An 82 year-old nun and two Army veterans, ages 57 and 63, cut through four layers of fences and reached the HEUMF, spray-painted antiwar slogans, hung crime tape and banners with biblical phrases, splashed blood, and sang hymns. When a guard arrived, the group offered him bread and read aloud a message about “transform[ing] weapons into real life-giving alternatives to build true peace.” The group surrendered, having caused $8,000 of damage to government property. The government charged them with injuring government property, 18 U.S.C. 1361, and violation of the peacetime provision of the Sabotage Act, 18 U.S.C. 2155(a), which applies if the defendant acted “with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense,” and authorizes a sentence of up to 20 years. A jury convicted the defendants on both counts. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part; the defendants lacked the intent necessary to violate the Sabotage Act. View "United States v. Walli" on Justia Law

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) prohibited Ege, a pilot for Emirates Airlines, from flying to, from, or over the United States. Ege had experienced travel problems and had submitted an online inquiry to the DHS’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program. He believes the TSA’s prohibition is based on his alleged inclusion on the “No-Fly List,” a subset of the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) used by the TSA to “deny boarding of individuals on commercial aircraft operated by U.S. carriers or flying to, from, or over the United States.” He sought removal from the No-Fly List or, at a minimum, a “meaningful opportunity to be heard.” The D.C. Circuit dismissed his petition for lack of standing and lack of jurisdiction. Neither the TSA nor the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the only two rnamed agencies, has “authority to decide whose name goes on the No-Fly List.” The Terrorist Screening Center, which is administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation), is “the sole entity with both the classified intelligence information” Ege wants and “the authority to remove” names from the No-Fly List/TSDB. View "Ege v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

In 1983, Pratt & Whitney made false statements to the Air Force while competing with GE to supply fighter jet engines. Pratt did not obtain more business and the fraud was discovered. The government filed a 1998 action before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals seeking relief under the Truth in Negotiations Act, and a 1999 federal court action, seeking relief under the False Claims Act and common law restitution. The government lost the administrative action. While Pratt’s statements violated the truth-in-negotiation requirements, the Board refused to lower the price of the contracts retroactively (the remedy permitted by the Act) because the Air Force had relied on the competitive bids, not the 1983 false statements, in determining a reasonable price for the contracts. The Federal Circuit affirmed. After it was established that Pratt violated the False Claims Act and that it owed the government $7 million in statutory penalties, the case was remanded for damages calculation. The district court awarded $657 million. The Sixth Circuit remanded again, noting that the matter has been in litigation for 17 years. The award was not supported by the evidence given the government expert’s refusal to account for the competition between the companies in setting a fair market value for the engines. View "United States v. United Techs. Corp." on Justia Law

The TSA screens passengers and property moving by passenger aircraft, 49 U.S.C. 44901(a) and is authorized to impose a “uniform fee . . . on passengers . . . in air transportation and intrastate air transportation originating at airports in the United States.” Airlines collect the fees from passengers and remit the funds to TSA. In 2013, Congress reset the fee to “$5.60 per one-way trip in air transportation or intrastate air transportation that originates at an airport in the United States.” TSA implemented the amendment; a “one-way trip” means a continuous trip from one point to another with no stopover exceeding specified limits, so that a trip from New York to Los Angeles to San Francisco and back to New York, with stopovers exceeding four hours would be three one-way trips. Airlines challenged TSA’s rules, arguing that TSA lacked authority to impose fees in excess of $11.20 on roundtrip itineraries that involved multiple “one-way trips.” While the case was pending, Congress amended the statute, mooting that claim. The airlines also claimed that the statute precludes TSA from charging a fee on travel that begins abroad but includes a connecting flight within the U.S. The D.C. Circuit held that the airlines have standing but accepted TSA’s explanation that its construction of ambiguous text better aligns the imposition of the fee with those who benefit from the security services provided. View "Airlines for Am. v. Transp. Sec. Admin" on Justia Law

The Federal Aviation Administration’s former Age 60 Rule required certain air carriers to cease scheduling pilots from operating aircraft when they turned age sixty. The Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act (FTEPA) abrogated the Age 60 Rule and was non-retroactive with two exceptions. Plaintiff, an airline pilot for American Airlines (American), turned age sixty six days before the Age 60 Rule was abrogated. Plaintiff requested to be reinstated in lieu of the FTEPA. American denied the request. Plaintiff then filed a complaint in a federal district court, alleging that he qualified for one of the exceptions to the FTEPA’s non-retroactivity clause. The district court granted American’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff did not qualify for an exception to the FTEPA’s non-retroactivity, and therefore, the FTEPA’s abrogation of the Age 60 Rule was inapplicable to Plaintiff and American was immunized from any civil liability. View "Weiland v. American Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

The 2002 Homeland Security Act provides that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) “shall prescribe regulations prohibiting the disclosure of information . . . if the Under Secretary decides that disclosur[e] would . . . be detrimental to the security of transportation,” 49 U.S.C. 114(r)(1)(C). TSA promulgated regulations prohibiting the unauthorized disclosure of “sensitive security information,” including “[s]pecific details of aviation security measures.” 49 CFR 1520.7(j). In 2003, TSA briefed all air marshals, including MacLean, about a potential plot to hijack passenger flights. A few days later, MacLean received from TSA a text message temporarily cancelling all overnight missions from Las Vegas. MacLean, who was stationed in Las Vegas, believed that cancelling those missions during a hijacking alert was dangerous and illegal; he told a reporter about the decision. TSA fired him. The Merit Systems Protection Board rejected claims that his disclosure was whistleblowing activity under 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A), which protects employees who disclose information that reveals “any violation of any law, rule, or regulation,” or “a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety” unless disclosure was “specifically prohibited by law.” The Federal Circuit vacated. The Supreme Court affirmed. MacLean’s disclosure was not specifically prohibited by law because regulations do not qualify as “law” under the whistleblower statute. Interpreting the word “law” to include rules and regulations could defeat the purpose of the statute, allowing an agency to insulate itself simply by promulgating a regulation that “specifically prohibited” all whistleblowing. MacLean’s disclosure was not prohibited by Section 114(r)(1). That statute does not prohibit anything, but only authorizes TSA to “prescribe regulations.” View "Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean" on Justia Law

The 2002 Homeland Security Act provides that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) “shall prescribe regulations prohibiting the disclosure of information . . . if the Under Secretary decides that disclosur[e] would . . . be detrimental to the security of transportation,” 49 U.S.C. 114(r)(1)(C). TSA promulgated regulations prohibiting the unauthorized disclosure of “sensitive security information,” including “[s]pecific details of aviation security measures.” 49 CFR 1520.7(j). In 2003, TSA briefed all air marshals, including MacLean, about a potential plot to hijack passenger flights. A few days later, MacLean received from TSA a text message temporarily cancelling all overnight missions from Las Vegas. MacLean, who was stationed in Las Vegas, believed that cancelling those missions during a hijacking alert was dangerous and illegal; he told a reporter about the decision. TSA fired him. The Merit Systems Protection Board rejected claims that his disclosure was whistleblowing activity under 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A), which protects employees who disclose information that reveals “any violation of any law, rule, or regulation,” or “a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety” unless disclosure was “specifically prohibited by law.” The Federal Circuit vacated. The Supreme Court affirmed. MacLean’s disclosure was not specifically prohibited by law because regulations do not qualify as “law” under the whistleblower statute. Interpreting the word “law” to include rules and regulations could defeat the purpose of the statute, allowing an agency to insulate itself simply by promulgating a regulation that “specifically prohibited” all whistleblowing. MacLean’s disclosure was not prohibited by Section 114(r)(1). That statute does not prohibit anything, but only authorizes TSA to “prescribe regulations.” View "Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean" on Justia Law