Justia Aerospace/Defense Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
Standley v. Department of Energy
Dr. Standley was employed by the Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration. Standley contends that over several years he sought to ensure that the Space and Atmospheric Burst Reporting System (SABRS) for nuclear detection, was funded and supported, believing this was required under section 1065 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008. He claims his superiors attempted to block funding and his work on SABRS. In 2015, Standley sent an email entitled “Obstruction of Public law 110- 118, NDAA 2008, Maintenance of Space-based Nuclear Detonation Detection System” to the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, with copies to Department of Defense representatives, and the Office of Special Counsel. Following several additional unsuccessful attempts to change DOE's position, Standley filed an unsuccessful appeal with the Merit Systems Protection Board, alleging that DOE and its employees retaliated against him for his efforts to change the DOE policy by not selecting him for any of three DOE Director positions posted in 2014-2017. Standley claimed he was engaging in protected whistleblowing when he opposed efforts to defund SABRS.
The Federal Circuit affirmed. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision. Section 1065 does not require that the DOE provide its SABRS program to the Secretary of Defense. The court acknowledged “Standley’s well-intentioned beliefs about the mission,” and his pro se status, but found his challenges to a government policy decision with which he disagreed unavailing. View "Standley v. Department of Energy" on Justia Law
Moss v. United Airlines, Inc.
Under a 2014 policy, United pilots only accrued sick time during the first 90 days of military leave. Moss, a pilot and a Lieutenant Colonel in the Marine Corps Reserves, sued, alleging violations of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301, which requires employers to provide employees on military leave any seniority-based benefit the employee would have accrued but for the military leave. He claimed that sick time is a seniority-based benefit that should have continuously accrued or sick-time accrual was available to pilots on comparable periods of leave.The district court granted United summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. For a benefit to be seniority-based, the benefit must be a reward for length of service. Sick leave is not such a reward but is "a future-oriented longevity incentive." United’s sick-time accrual policy contains a work requirement and is in the nature of compensation, not a reward for long service.
. View "Moss v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law
Bishop v. Air Line Pilots Association, International
United Airlines pilot instructors sued their union, ALPA, alleging that ALPA had breached its duty of fair representation in its allocation of a retroactive pay settlement among different groups of pilots. The district court dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit reversed. A claim of discrimination or bad faith must rest on more than a showing that a union’s actions treat different groups of employees differently and must be based on more than the discriminatory impact of the union’s otherwise rational decision to compromise. The Instructors sufficiently and plausibly pleaded that ALPA acted in bad faith in its allocation of retroactive pay between the line pilots and pilot instructors. A union may not make decisions “solely for the benefit of a stronger, more politically favored group over a minority group.” The plaintiffs have alleged that pilot instructors make up a minority of ALPA’s membership and that ALPA acted with the intent to appease its majority membership, the line pilots, after a lengthy and contentious CBA negotiation. View "Bishop v. Air Line Pilots Association, International" on Justia Law
O’Farrell v. Department of Defense
On September 11, 2012, President Obama published notice “continuing for [one] year the national emergency . . . with respect to the terrorist attacks.” In April 2013, O’Farrell, an Army Reservist, received an order directing him to replace another Reservist, an attorney, who had been deployed. After reaching his maximum total years of active commissioned service (28 years), O’Farrell was transferred to the Army Reserve Retired List in October 2013. O’Farrell served his active duty as legal counsel until September 30, 2013. By August 26, 2013, O’Farrell had used his 15 days of military leave, most of his accrued annual leave, and advance annual leave. To avoid being placed on Military Leave Without Pay for the remainder of his active duty service, O’Farrell (unsuccessfully) requested an additional 22 days leave under 5 U.S.C. 6323(a)(1). O’Farrell did not cite any statutory provision that would qualify him as "called to full-time military service as a result of a call or order to active duty in support of a contingency operation." He argued that he was “serving . . . during a national emergency." O’Farrell sued under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4301– 4333. The Federal Circuit reversed. Section 6323(b) does not require that “a specific contingency operation" be identified in military orders when an employee is activated; “in support of” includes indirect assistance to a contingency operation, 5 U.S.C. 6323(b)(2)(B), which includes a military operation that results in service members being called to active duty under any law during a national emergency, 10 U.S.C. 101(a)(13). A service member’s leave request need not use particular language. View "O'Farrell v. Department of Defense" on Justia Law
O’Farrell v. Department of Defense
On September 11, 2012, President Obama published notice “continuing for [one] year the national emergency . . . with respect to the terrorist attacks.” In April 2013, O’Farrell, an Army Reservist, received an order directing him to replace another Reservist, an attorney, who had been deployed. After reaching his maximum total years of active commissioned service (28 years), O’Farrell was transferred to the Army Reserve Retired List in October 2013. O’Farrell served his active duty as legal counsel until September 30, 2013. By August 26, 2013, O’Farrell had used his 15 days of military leave, most of his accrued annual leave, and advance annual leave. To avoid being placed on Military Leave Without Pay for the remainder of his active duty service, O’Farrell (unsuccessfully) requested an additional 22 days leave under 5 U.S.C. 6323(a)(1). O’Farrell did not cite any statutory provision that would qualify him as "called to full-time military service as a result of a call or order to active duty in support of a contingency operation." He argued that he was “serving . . . during a national emergency." O’Farrell sued under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4301– 4333. The Federal Circuit reversed. Section 6323(b) does not require that “a specific contingency operation" be identified in military orders when an employee is activated; “in support of” includes indirect assistance to a contingency operation, 5 U.S.C. 6323(b)(2)(B), which includes a military operation that results in service members being called to active duty under any law during a national emergency, 10 U.S.C. 101(a)(13). A service member’s leave request need not use particular language. View "O'Farrell v. Department of Defense" on Justia Law
Hale v. Johnson
All Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) plant officers are required to maintain medical clearance as a condition of employment. Since his employment began in 2009, Hale maintained the clearance necessary for his position. In 2013, the TVA began requiring a pulmonary function test for that clearance; Hale failed the testing and was terminated because of his chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder. Hale sued, alleging disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. In an unsuccessful motion to dismiss, the TVA argued that Title VII’s national-security exemption applies to the Rehabilitation Act and precludes the court from reviewing the physical-fitness requirements imposed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the interests of national security and that the Egan doctrine precludes the judiciary from reviewing the TVA’s determination that Hale lacked the physical capacity to fulfill his job duties because this decision was one of national security. The Sixth Circuit denied an interlocutory appeal; the national security exemption does not apply to Hale’s Rehabilitation Act claim. The court declined to extend Egan to preclude judicial review of an agency’s determination regarding an employee’s physical capability to perform the duties of his position. View "Hale v. Johnson" on Justia Law
Wilson v. Department of the Navy
Wilson was a civilian Resource Analyst at the Nuclear Propulsion Directorate at the Naval Sea Systems Command, which required a Department of Energy security clearance. The DOE revoked Wilson’s security clearance, stating that Wilson: knowingly brought a personal firearm onto a Navy facility in violation of regulations; armed himself with a personal weapon while acting as a Metropolitan Police Department reserve officer, contrary to regulations; and made false statements and false time and attendance entries to his civilian employer, the Naval Reserve Unit and the MPD. Wilson maintains that he brought his firearm to the facility in response to the 2013 Washington Navy Yard shooting, in perceived compliance with his duty as a Navy Reservist, and requested reinstatement under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4301. The Navy removed Wilson from federal service. A Merit Systems Protection Board administrative judge determined that the Board lacked authority to consider claims of discrimination or reprisal in the context of a removal based on security clearance revocation; that the Navy provided him the procedural protections of 5 U.S.C. 7513(b); and that the Navy did not have a policy to reassign employees to alternate positions that do not require a security clearance. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s finding that it lacked the authority to consider Wilson’s USERRA claim. View "Wilson v. Department of the Navy" on Justia Law
Acevedo v. United States
Plaintiffs, employed by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, (CBP) as Supply Chain Security Specialists in its Customs-Trade Protection Against Terrorism program, travelled and worked at foreign posts designated by the Secretary of State as “danger pay posts.” They alleged that they did not receive overtime pay as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 216(b). Count II, citing the Overseas Differentials and Allowances Act (ODAA) of 1960, 5 U.S.C. 5928, claimed that CBP denied them danger pay allowances for work performed at posts that the Department of State has designated as eligible for such allowances. The Claims Court dismissed Count II for lack of jurisdiction on grounds that ODAA is not a money-mandating statute, that the State Department regulation (DSSR) is not money-mandating, and that CBP has not adopted a policy of paying danger pay to all eligible employees. The Federal Circuit affirmed; section 5928, the DSSR, and the alleged unwritten policy of providing danger pay, cannot reasonably be construed as “money-mandating.” View "Acevedo v. United States" on Justia Law
Marshall v. Woodward, Inc.
Plaintiffs, Woodward employees, filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, alleging that Woodward falsely certified helicopter engine parts that it sold to the government. Plaintiffs had complained that the sensors at issue did not meet quality standards and had refused to work on the order. Following an investigation, a Defense Contract Management Agency Technical Specialist concluded that there was “nothing either incorrect or wrong with the procedures, assembly, or testing of the sensors.” The government continues to order, pay for, and use Woodward’s sensor The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Woodward, agreeing that even if Woodward made false statements to the government, no reasonable jury could find that it made the statements knowingly or that the statements were material. View "Marshall v. Woodward, Inc." on Justia Law
Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Employees v. Dep’t of the Army
The National Federation of Federal Employees Local 1442 filed a group grievance on behalf of 138 NFFE bargaining unit employees at Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD); Local 2109 filed two grievances on behalf of all of bargaining unit employees at Watervliet Arsenal (WVA). In both grievances, the Union challenged the furloughing of bargaining unit employees for six discontinuous days between July and September in Fiscal Year 2013. The furloughs were the result of an automatic process of federal agency spending reductions called “sequestration.” Arbitrator Kaplan ruled that the furloughs of the employees at LEAD were in accordance with law. Months later, Arbitrator Gross ruled that the furloughs of WVA security employees were not in accordance with law, but that the furloughs of non-security bargaining unit employees at WVA were in accordance with law. The Federal Circuit upheld both decisions. Arbitrators Kaplan and Gross had substantial evidence before them demonstrating that the furlough decisions were reasonable management solutions to the financial restrictions placed on DOD by the sequester, thus promoting the efficiency of the service. View "Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Dep't of the Army" on Justia Law